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Abstract
We survey recent work on the specification of an access
control mechanism in a collaborative environment. The work
is presented in the context of the WebdamLog language, an
extension of datalog to a distributed context. We discuss a
fine-grained access control mechanism for intentional data
based on provenance as well as a control mechanism for
delegation, i.e., for deploying rules at remote peers.
1. Introduction
The personal data and favorite applications of a Web user
are typically distributed across many heterogeneous devices
and systems, e.g., residing on a smartphone, laptop, tablet,
TV box, or managed by Facebook, Google, etc. Additional
data and computational resources are also available to the
user from relatives, friends, colleagues, possibly via social
network systems. Web users are thus increasingly at risk of
having private data leak and in general of losing control over
their own information. In this paper, we consider a novel
collaborative access control mechanism that provides users
with the means to control access to their data by others and
the functioning of applications they run.
Our focus is information management in environments
where both data and programs are distributed. In such
settings, there are four essential requirements for access
control:
Data access Users would like to control who can read and
modify their information.
Application control Users would like to control which ap-
plications can run on their behalf, and what information
these applications can access.
Data dissemination Users would like to control how
pieces of information are transferred from one partici-
pant to another, and how they are combined, with the
owner of each piece keeping some control over it.
Declarativeness The specification of the exchange of data,
applications, and of access control policies should be
declarative. The goal is to enable anyone to specify access
control.
To illustrate each of these requirements, let us consider
the functionalities of a social network such as Facebook, in
which users interact by exchanging data and applications.
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First, a user who wants to control who sees her information,
can use a classic access control mechanism, such as the one
currently employed by Facebook, based on groups of friends.
Next, let us consider a user who installs an application.
This typically involves opening much of her data to a server
that is possibly managed by an unknown third party. Many
Facebook users see this as unreasonable, and would like to
control what the application can do on their behalf, and
what information the application can access. Third, with
respect to data dissemination, users would like to specify
what other users can do with their data, e.g., whether their
friends are allowed to show their pictures to their respective
friends. Finally, the users want to specify access control on
their data without having to write programs. Thus, this
simple example already demonstrates the need for each one
of the four above requirements.
From a formal point of view, we define an access con-
trol mechanism for WebdamLog, a declarative datalog-style
language that emphasizes cooperation between autonomous
peers [2]. We obtain a language that allows for declaratively
specifying both data exchange and access control policies
governing this exchange. There are different aspects to our
access control:
• For extensional data, the mechanism is standard, based
on access control lists at each peer, specifying who owns
and who can read/write data in each relation of that
peer.
• For intentional data, the mechanism is more sophisti-
cated and fine-grained. It is based on provenance. In brief,
only users with read access to all the tuples that partic-
ipated in the derivation of a fact can read this fact.
• The previous two mechanisms are used by default, and
we also support the means of overriding them.
• Finally, we introduce a mechanism for controlling the
use of delegation in WebdamLog, which allows peers to
delegate work to remote peers by installing rules, and is
one of the main originalities of WebdamLog.
Note that access control is implemented natively as part
of the WebdamLog framework. The main idea is to use
extensional relations to specify access to extensional data.
Thus accessibility of extensional facts is itself recorded as
extensional facts, which can then be used by a WebdamLog
program to derive access to intentional data.
Organization This short paper is organized as follows.
The Webdamlog language is presented in Section 2. In
Section 3, we present some aspects of access control. We
conclude in Section 4.
2. Webdamlog
In [2], we introduced Webdamlog, a novel Datalog-style rule-
based language. In Webdamlog, each piece of information
belongs to a principal. We distinguish between two kinds of
principals: peer and virtual principal. A peer, e.g., AlicePhone
or Picasa, has storage and processing capabilities, and can
receive and handle queries and update requests. A virtual
principal, e.g., Alice or RockClimbingClub, represents a user
or a group of users, and relies on peers for storage and pro-
cessing. We further distinguish between facts, representing
local tuples and messages between peers, and rules, which
may be evaluated locally or delegated to other peers.
Webdamlog is primarily meant to be used in a distributed
setting. Perhaps the main novelty of the language is the
notion of delegation, which amounts to a peer installing a
rule on another peer. In its simplest form, delegation is a
remote materialized view. In its general form, it allows peers
to exchange knowledge beyond simple facts, providing the
means for a peer to delegate work to other peers. We will
not describe Webdamlog in detail here, but will illustrate it
with examples, referring the interested reader to [2].
The following are examples of Webdamlog facts:
agenda@AlicePhone(12/12/2012, 10 : 00, John,Orsay)
photos@Picasa(fileName : picture34.jpg,
date : 09/12/2012, byteStream : 010001)
writeSecret@Picasa(login : Alice, password : HG − FT23)
The first fact represents a tuple in relation agenda on peer
AlicePhone with information about an upcoming meeting,
and the second, a photo in Alice’s Picasa account (a tuple
in relation photos on peer Picasa). The third fact represents
Alice’s login credentials for her Picasa account (in relation
writeSecret on peer Picasa). Suppose that Alice wishes to
retrieve, and store on her laptop, photos from Fontainbleau
outings that were taken by other members of her rock
climbing group. To this effect, Alice issues the following rule:
outingPhotos@AliceLaptop($pic) :-
rockClimbingGroup@Facebook($member),
findPhoto@AliceLaptop($member, $photos, $peer),
$photos@$peer($pic, $meta),
contains@$peer($meta,Fontainbleau)
This rule is a standard Webdamlog rule that illustrates
various salient features of the language. First, the rule is
declarative. Second, the assignment of values to peer names
(e.g., $peer) and relation names (e.g., $photos) is determined
during rule evaluation. Third, for $peer assigned to a system
other than AliceLaptop (e.g., Picasa or Flickr), the activation
of this rule will result in activating rules (by delegation),
or in some processing simulating them in other systems.
The evaluation of rules such as this one is performed by
the Webdamlog system, which is responsible for handing
communication and security protocols, and also includes a
datalog evaluation engine, namely the Bud system [5].
The semantics of a Webdamlog rule depends on the
location of the relations occurring in this rule. Let p be a
particular peer. We say that a rule is local to p if the relations
occurring in the body are all in p; intuitively, p can run such
a rule. The effect of a rule will also depend on whether the
relation in the head of the rule is local (to p) or not and
whether it is extensional or intentional.
Generally speaking, Webdamlog supports the following
kinds of rules.
• A. Local rule with local intentional head. These rules, like
classical datalog rules, define local intentional relations,
i.e., logical views.
• B. Local rule with local extensional head. These rules
derive new facts that are inserted into the local data-
base. Note that, by default, as in Dedalus [3], facts are
not persistent. To have them persist, we use rules of the
form m@p(U) :- m@p(U). Deletion can be captured by
controlling the persistence of facts.
• C. Local rule with non-local extensional head. Facts
derived by such rules are sent to other peers and stored
in an extensional relation at that peer, implementing a
form of messaging.
• D. Local rule with non-local intentional head. Such a rule
defines a new intentional relation at a remote peer based
on local relations of the defining peer.
• E. Non-local. Rules of this kind allow a peer to install
a rule at a remote peer, which is itself defined in terms
of relations of other remote peers. This is the delegation
mechanism that enables the sharing of application logic
by peers, for instance, obtaining logic (rules) from other
sites, and deploying logic (rules) to other sites.
3. Access control in Webdamlog
We present three simple examples that highlight particular
aspects of access control in WebdamlLog.
Fine-grained access control on intentional data Sup-
pose that an intentional relation allPhotos@Alice has been
specified by Alice. Suppose that Alice gives the right to
friends, say Bob and Sue, to insert pictures into this relation.
Alice’s friends can do this by defining the rules:
[at Bob] allPhotos@Alice($f) :- bobPhotos@Bob($f)
[at Sue] allPhotos@Alice($f) :- suePhotos@Sue($f)
(Relation names bobPhotos and suePhotos are underlined to
indicate that they are extensional.) allPhotos@Alice is inten-
tional and is now defined as the union of bobPhotos@Bob
and suePhotos@Sue.
The read privilege on allPhotos@Alice is a prerequisite
to having access to the contents of this relation, but access
is also controlled by the provenance of each fact, making
read access fine-grained. One can think of each intentional
fact as carrying its provenance, i.e., how it has been derived.
In our simple example of Alice’s album, the provenance of
a photo coming from Bob will simply be the provenance to-
ken associated with the corresponding fact at Bob. Then,
to be able to read a fact in allPhotos@Alice that is com-
ing from bobPhotos@Bob, Charlie will need read access on
bobPhotos@Bob. To see a slightly more complicated exam-
ple, suppose that a fact F may be obtained by taking the
join of two base facts F1, F2; and that the same fact may be
obtained alternatively by projection of a fact F3. To access
F a peer would need to have read access to its container
(the relation that contains it) as well as to facts that suffice
to derive it, here F3 or the pair (F1, F2). In other words, a
peer that has read access to an intentional fact must have
sufficient rights to derive that fact.
Overriding the default semantics For intentional data,
we use by default an access control based on the full prove-
nance of each fact. (If a fact is derived in several ways, each
derivation specifies a sufficient access right.) Access control
based on full provenance may be more restrictive than is
needed in some applications, and we provide the means to
override it. Consider the following rule that Alice uses to
publish her own photos to her friends:
[at Alice] allPhotos@$x($f) :-
alicePhotos@Alice($f), [hide friends@Alice($x)]
Ignore the hide annotation first. This rule is copying
the photos of Alice’s friends into their respective allPhotos
relations. A friend, say Pete, will be allowed to see one of
Alice’s photos only if he is entitled to read the relation
friends@Alice. Now, it may be the case that Alice does not
want to share this relation with Pete, and so Pete will not
see her photos. The effect of the hide annotation is that
the provenance of facts coming from friends@Alice is hidden.
With this annotation, Pete will be able to see the photos.
This feature is indispensable in preventing access control
from becoming too restrictive.
Controlling delegation Recall that general delegation al-
lows rules with non-local relations in the body. This leads to
significant flexibility for application development and is the
main distinguishing feature of the Webdamlog framework.
It also creates challenges for access control.
The following example illustrates the danger of a simplis-
tic semantics for non-local rules. Consider the two rules:
[at Bob] message@Sue(“I hate you”) :- date@Alice($d)
aliceSecret@Bob($x) :-
date@Alice($d), secret@Alice($x)
If we ignore access rights, by delegation, this results in
running the following two rules at Alice’s peer:
[at Alice] message@Sue(“I hate you”) :- date@Alice($d)
aliceSecret@Bob($x) :-
date@Alice($d), secret@Alice($x)
Assuming date@Alice($d) succeeds, then by the first rule
Alice sends some hate mail to Sue, and by the second it
sends the contents of the relation secret@Alice to Bob, even
if Alice did not give read access on this relation to Bob.
The main reason for this problem is that (by the standard
semantics of Webdamlog) we are running the delegation
rules as if they were run by Alice. Under access control, we
are going to run them in a sandbox with Bob’s privileges.
So with the first rule, the hate message will be sent but
marked as coming from Bob. And with the second, the data
will be sent only if Bob has read access to secret@Alice. So,
for a client c delegating a rule to a server, the semantics of
delegation under access control policies guarantees that:
• If the rule has side effects (e.g., it results in the insertion
of tuples in the relation of another peer), the author of
the update is c.
• The access privileges with which the rule executes are
those of c.
Note that, in practice, Alice sends Sue a message saying that
the author of the message is Bob. So, Sue may question this
fact and asks Alice to prove that this is indeed the case. But
if this is indeed the case, Alice has the delegation from Bob
to prove her good faith.
Delegation is at the heart of distributed processing. With
delegation, a peer p can ask another peer q to do some
processing on its behalf. A natural question is whether this
will yield exactly the same semantics (with possibly very
different performance) as if p were getting the data locally
and running a local computation. It turns out that the
semantics is different. This is because q will use data that
(i) q has access to; and (ii) p has access to (because of the
sandboxing). On the other hand, a local computation at p
is limited by (ii) but not by (i).
4. Conclusion
The WebdamLog language has been introduced in [2]. The
system has been implemented and different aspects have
been demonstrated in conferences [1, 4]. The access control
mechanism is currently being implemented. The fine-grained
mechanism for intentional data raises various issues. In
particular, the materialization of intentional relations may
generate lots of data if performed naively. This is the topic
of on-going research.
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